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TORTS - DOMESTIC LAW - MARYLAND ABROGATES IN-
TERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY IN NEGLIGENCE CASES. Boblitz v.
Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983).
Mrs. Boblitz sued her estranged husband in the Superior Court of
Baltimore City' to recover damages for injuries she suffered while rid-
ing in an automobile negligently driven by him.2 The trial judge
granted the husband's motion for summary judgment, noting that the
wife had no cause of action to sue her husband in tort under Maryland
law.' On appeal,4 the Court of Appeals of Maryland reevaluated
Maryland's interspousal immunity rule and abrogated it with respect to
negligence cases.'
The interspousal immunity rule, a product of the common law
presumption of the unity of husband and wife, precluded either spouse
from bringing a tort action against the other.6 At common law, mar-
riage merged the legal existence of the wife into her husband, and she
became enveloped under his "cover," subject to the legal disability of
coverture. 7 A wife could make no contracts or be a party to litigation
unless jointly with her husband.' Suits between husband and wife were
thus precluded since a husband would be both a joint and adverse
party in any action.9 This judicial bar to a suit by a spouse was applied
by a majority of American courts through the first half of the twentieth
1. Effective January 1, 1983, The Superior Court of Baltimore City became the Cir-
cuit Court of Baltimore City.
2. See Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 243, 462 A.2d 506, 506 (1983).
3. Id at 243-44, 462 A.2d at 506.
4. The court of appeals granted the wife's petition for certiorari prior to considera-
tion by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md.
242, 242 (1983).
5. Id at 275, 462 A.2d at 522; see infra notes 45 & 51 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 614-15 (1910); Furstenburg v.
Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247, 249, 136 A. 534, 535 (1927).
7. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442-43; 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 8.10 (4th ed. 1974); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 122 (4th ed. 1971).
8. See sources cited supra note 7.
9. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 122. Dean Prosser explained that:
If the man were the tort-feasor, the woman's right would be a chose in
action which the husband would have the right to reduce to possession,
and he must be joined as a plaintiff against himself and the proceeds
recovered must be paid to him. . . . If the wife committed the tort, the
husband would be liable to himself for it, and must be joined as a de-
fendant in his own action.
Id. ; see also F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 7, § 8.10 (practical inability of
spouse to sue spouse at common law). Early decisions also expressed the archaic
notion that "it is better to draw the curtain, shut out the public gaze, and leave the
parties to forget and forgive," rather than to allow an interspousal suit. David v.
David, 161 Md. 532, 539, 157 A. 755, 758 (1932) (quoting State v. Oliver, 70 N.C.
60 (1873)). This view was supported with the argument that interspousal suits
would adversely affect marital unity and harmony. See infra note 16. The doc-
trine of interspousal immunity extended to actions instituted after a divorce, and
to those seeking redress for a wrong that occurred before marriage. Hudson v.
Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 526-27, 174 A.2d 339, 341-42 (1961) (before marriage);
David v. David, 161 Md. 532, 539, 157 A. 755, 757 (1932) (after divorce).
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century. '
With the passage at the turn of the century of "Married Women's
Acts," which generally granted the wife a right to sue or be sued as if
she were a "feme sole,""II a minority of courts found a justification to
abrogate interspousal immunity. 2 Most courts, however, held that the
acts were not intended to grant a wife the right to sue her husband in
tort.' 3 The Supreme Court's decision in Thompson v. Thompson,' 4 rep-
resentative of the predominant view, reasoned that if the legislative au-
thors of the Married Women's Act had intended to abrogate the rule,
they would have expressly done so.' 5 The Thompson Court also stated
that construing the statute to grant the wife a cause of action would
encourage trivial suits and disturb domestic harmony. 16 Further, the
Court noted that the wife had sufficient recourse in criminal, divorce,
and chancery courts. '7 Courts since Thompson have also reasoned that
abrogation of the immunity would provide a source for fraudulent
claims against insurance companies.
After 1970, however, state courts began to abolish interspousal tort
immunity despite earlier decisions holding that Married Women's Acts
10. See Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 276-81, 462 A.2d 506, 522-24 (1983) (listing
jurisdictions and status of immunity).
11. These acts were passed in each jurisdiction. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 7,
§ 8.10; W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 122.
12. Penton v. Penton, 223 Ala. 282, 135 So. 481 (1931); Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d
95 (Alaska 1963); Leach v. Leach, 227 Ark. 599, 300 S.W.2d 15 (1957); Rains v.
Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935); Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889
(1914); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953); Hosko v. Hosko, 385 Mich.
39, 187 N.W.2d 236 (1971) (court construed a revised statute); Gilman v. Gilman,
78 N.H. 4, 95 A. 657 (1915); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206
(1920); Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932); Courtney
v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938); Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S.C. 129,
166 S.E. 101 (1932); Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941); Taylor
v. Patten, 2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954); Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 300
A.2d 637 (1973); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338 (W. Va. 1978); Wait
v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926); cf. Thompson v. Thompson, 218
U.S. 611, 619-24 (1910) (Harlan, Hughes & Holmes, JJ., dissenting).
13. See Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 526, 174 A.2d 339, 341 (1961) (listing
authority).
14. 218 U.S. 611 (1910).
15. Id at 618. The Thompson Court explained that the District of Columbia Married
Women's Act, D.C. CODE ANN. § 1155 (1901), did not allow interspousal suits,
but merely allowed a wife to bring tort actions in her own name that at common
law could have been brought only jointly with her husband. Thompson, 218 U.S.
at 617; see also Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247, 252-53, 136 A. 534, 536
(1927) (adopting Thompson's reasoning). The Thompson Court's logic is ques-
tionable, however, since if the act removed the requirement that the husband be
named as joint party, then the practical barrier to interspousal suits disappeared
as well. Interspousal suits would no longer force the husband to be both a joint
and an adverse party. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
16. See Thompson, 218 U.S. at 617-18.
17. Id at 619.
18. See, e.g., Alfree v. Alfree, 410 A.2d 161, 163 (Del. 1979); Raisen v. Raisen, 379
So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. 1979).
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did not authorize interspousal suits.' 9 These later decisions reasoned
that the interspousal immunity rule is obsolete and that modem society
will not tolerate this remnant of coverture. 20 Although two states since
1970 have sustained interspousal immunity,2' most states analyzing the
issue have abolished the rule. Thus, the minority has become a major-
ity; thirty-six states have abrogated interspousal immunity at least in
part.
22
In the first Court of Appeals of Maryland decision to examine in-
terspousal tort immunity,23 Furstenburg v. Furstenburg,24 the court ap-
plied the Thompson analysis and held that Maryland's Married
Women's Act 25 could not be construed to allow interspousal tort suits.
26
Subsequent decisions by the court of appeals steadfastly followed Fur-
stenburg and refused to abrogate interspousal immunity when no ex-
press legislative mandate granted the right to interspousal suits.
27
19. Imig v. March, 203 Neb. 537, 538-39, 279 N.W.2d 382, 383 (1979); Merenoff v.
Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 543, 388 A.2d 951, 955 (1978); Digby v. Digby, 388 A.2d 1,
2 (R.I. 1978); Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Tenn. 1983); Surratt v.
Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 192, 183 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1971). Maryland joined these
states m Boblitz by abrogating interspousal immunity despite the court's earlier
holding in Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247, 249, 136 A. 534, 535 (1927),
that Maryland's Married Women's Act did not provide for interspousal actions.
See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
In addition, some states have abolished the rule, at least partially, without
analyzing their Married Women's Acts. See Fernandez v. Romo, 132 Ariz. 447,
646 P.2d 878 (1982); Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972);
Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616 (Iowa 1979); MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412
A.2d 71 (Me. 1980); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Maestas
v. Overton, 87 N.M. 213, 531 P.2d 947 (1975); Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925
(Tex. 1977).
20. See supra note 19.
21. Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1979); Peters v. Peters, 63 Hawaii 653, 634
P.2d 586 (1981).
22. See Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 276-81, 462 A.2d 506, 522-24 (1983) (listing
states); Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1983) (decided after Boblitz).
23. Interspousal immunity was not limited to tort actions between husband and wife,
but extended to actions by a wife against her husband's partnership, David v.
David, 161 Md. 532, 157 A. 755 (1932), her husband's employer, Riegger v. Bur-
ton Brewing Co., 178 Md. 518, 16 A.2d 99 (1940), actions in implied contract,
Gregg v. Gregg, 199 Md. 662, 87 A.2d 581 (1952), and actions in tortious replevin,
Fernandez v. Fernandez, 214 Md. 519, 135 A.2d 886 (1957).
24. 152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534 (1927).
25. MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, § 5 (1898) (current version at MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, § 5
(1957 & Supp. 1983)).
26. Furstenburg, 152 Md. at 252-53, 136 A. at 535. The Furstenburg court stressed
that the General Assembly had shown an even stronger intent to preclude inter-
spousal suits than did Congress in enacting the District of Columbia statute. Two
years after the enactment of Maryland's first Married Women's Act, the General
Assembly passed a second statute that granted to the wife the right to contract and
to form a copartnership with her husband, and to sue and be sued upon those
contracts and copartnerships. MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, § 20 (1957) (current ver-
sion). The court reasoned that the second statute would have been superfluous if
the General Assembly had intended to allow a wife to sue her husband under the
original provisions. Furstenburg, 152 Md. at 252, 136 A. at 535-36.
27. See Stokes v. Association of Indep. Taxi Operators, 248 Md. 690, 692, 237 A.2d
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These decisions reasoned that interspousal tort suits would unnecessa-
rily disrupt home life;28 that the wife had a sufficient remedy;29 that
litigation would increase; 30 and that abrogation would encourage a sur-
viving spouse to plunder the decedent's estate.3'
In Boblitz v. Boblitz,32 the court of appeals departed from its fifty-
six year adherence to Furstenburg and abolished interspousal immunity
with respect to negligence cases. 3 The Boblitz court noted that the use
of "interspousal immunity" to describe the ancient bar to suits between
husband and wife "border[ed] on mockery. ' 34 The court observed that
other courts that had initially supported the doctrine were troubled by
their earlier decisions,35 and at least two decisions of the court of ap-
peals expressed misgivings about the rule. 36 After examining the deci-
sional law from each jurisdiction,37 the court concluded that
interspousal immunity was a "vestige of the past."' 38 The court found
further support for its decision in Maryland's Equal Rights
Amendment.39
Boblitz removes the artificial barrier that had prevented married
persons from recovering against each other in negligence. The bases
for the doctrine of interspousal immunity have long ceased to be via-
762, 763 (1968); Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 524-26, 174 A.2d 339, 340-41
(1961); Ennis v. Donovan, 222 Md. 536, 543, 161 A.2d 698, 702 (1960); Fernan-
dez v. Fernandez, 214 Md. 519, 524, 135 A.2d 886, 888-89 (1957); Gregg v. Gregg,
199 Md. 662, 667-68, 87 A.2d 581, 583 (1952); Riegger v. Burton Brewing Co., 178
Md. 518, 521-23, 16 A.2d 99, 100-01 (1940); David v. David, 161 Md. 532, 535,
157 A. 755, 756 (1932).
28. Such a suit "would introduce into the home, the basic unit of organized society[,]
discord, suspicion and distrust, and would be inconsistent with the common wel-
fare." David v. David, 161 Md. 532, 535, 157 A. 755, 756 (1932); see also Riegger
v. Burton Brewing Co., 178 Md. 518, 522, 16 A.2d 99, 101 (1940) (citing David).
29. David v. David, 161 Md. 532, 539, 157 A. 755, 758 (1932).
30. Id at 539-40, 157 A. at 758.
31. Id at 540, 157 A. at 758.
32. 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983).
33. Id. at 275, 462 A.2d at 522.
34. Id at 245, 462 A.2d at 507 (emphasis in original).
35. Id at 251, 462 A.2d at 510.
36. Id (citing Fernandez v. Fernandez, 214 Md. 519, 135 A.2d 886 (1957); Gregg v.
Gregg, 199 Md. 662, 666-67, 87 A.2d 581, 582-83 (1952)); cf. Lusby v. Lusby, 283
Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77passim (1978) (also expressing misgivings about rule).
37. Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 252-69, 462 A.2d 506, 511-19 (1983). The court
grouped the states into three categories: (1) those continuing to recognize inter-
spousal immunity; (2) those abrogating the immunity with respect only to motor
torts, all personal injury actions, or intentional torts, and; (3) those fully abrogat-
ing immunity. The Boblitz court discussed illustrative cases in each group. The
court appended to its opinion a list of the principal cases and, in addition, indi-
cated the status of interspousal immunity in 49 states, the District of Columbia,
and in admiralty. Id at 276-81, 462 A.2d at 522-24.
38. Id at 273, 462 A.2d at 521.
39. MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 46. "[Any ancient deprivation of
rights based upon sex would contravene the basic law of this State." Boblitz, 296
Md. at 274-75, 462 A.2d at 522.
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ble.4° Husband and wife are no longer considered by courts to be one
entity;4' the incidents of coverture that gave rise to the doctrine no
longer exist. Under modem law, the husband is not forced by an inter-
spousal suit to assume the role of both defendant and joint plaintiff.42
Marital harmony will be left unaffected by the Boblitz decision. In
Maryland, liability insurance is required for all automobile drivers.43
Interspousal actions involving negligent driving will leave intact the
marital harmony existing before the accident, since no animosity be-
tween the spouses will result from suits aimed at insurance companies.
The Boblitz decision is not, however, limited to automobile cases." In-
deed, the decision extends to any instance of negligent conduct between
spouses that is not precluded by the "mutual concessions implied in the
marital relationship."45 Still, medical or homeowner's insurance will
provide an additional buffer to preserve marital harmony in cases not
involving automobiles.
Even when a defendant/spouse carries no insurance, however,
marital harmony will remain unaffected. In the absence of insurance,
couples will usually pool their resources to rehabilitate the injured
spouse. When a person negligently injures his spouse and refuses to
offer financial assistance, there is little harmony in the marriage to pre-
serve.4 6 Any further disruption to the marriage is far outweighed by
the need to make the injured person whole.
The abrogation of interspousal immunity is not likely to increase
the incidence of fraud. Although the confidential relationship of hus-
band and wife provides a basis for collusion against insurance compa-
nies, the adversary system is capable of ferreting out possible fraud
cases.4 7 The Boblitz court further limits situations in which fraud may
occur by requiring that causes of action be judged on a case-by-case
40. See Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753passim (Tenn. 1983).
41. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980); MacDonald v. Mac-
Donald, 412 A.2d 71, 74 (Me. 1980).
42. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
43. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 17-103 (1977 & Supp. 1983).
44. Many jurisdictions limit abrogation to motor vehicle torts only. Rogers v. Yel-
lowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1975); Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass.
619, 351 N.E.2d 526 (1976); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974);
Digby v. Digby, 388 A.2d 1 (R.I. 1978); Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 300 A.2d
637 (1973); Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971).
45. Boblitz, 296 Md. at 275, 462 A.2d at 522. The court indicated that a case-by-case
approach would be taken to determine which actions fall within the "mutual con-
cessions implied in the marital relationship." Id. Boblitz provides no guidance,
however, as to the standards to be employed in determining what mutual conces-
sions are implied in this relationship.
46. Cf W. PROSSER, supra note 7, § 122, at 863 (with respect to intentional torts be-
tween spouses, there is no "state of peace and harmony left to be disturbed").
47. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Romo, 132 Ariz. 447, 646 P.2d 878 (1982); Klein v. Klein,
58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962); Brown v. Gosser, 262
S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953); Merenoffv. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978);
Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970). When an insurer fears collu-
sion, it may reveal its status in an interspousal suit and treat both spouses as hos-
[Vol. 13
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basis because of the nature of marriage and the mutual concessions it
implies.48 In addition, insurers may guard against fraud by inserting
exculpatory clauses in insurance contracts. Although these clauses may
later be held ineffective as a violation of public policy or as unconscion-
able,49 courts have generally upheld these clauses.5" Indeed, in apply-
ing its holding prospectively, 5 the Boblitz court suggests an intention
to warn insurers to prepare for the increased litigation that will result
from the abrogation of the spousal immunity rule.
5 2
The obsolescence of the interspousal immunity rule serves to de-
feat the argument of the dissent in Boblitz, which asserted that the ab-
rogation of the rule is a legislative function.53 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland, which stringently adheres to stare decisis,54 has consistently
shown its wariness to change a time weathered, judicially created rule
when the change has broad public policy implications.5 5 Despite this
tile witnesses so as to use impeachment devices to unearth any fraud. See
Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978).
48. Boblitz, 296 Md. at 275, 462 A.2d at 522.
49. Note, Interspousal Immunity in Maryland, 41 MD. L. REV. 181, 189-90 (1981);
Note, Intrafamilial Immunity in New Jersey: Dismantling the Barrier to Personal
Injury Litigation, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 661, 681-83 (1979). For an especially in-
structive article on exclusion clauses and intrafamilial immunity, see Ashdown,
Intrafamily Immunity, Pure Compensation, and the Family Exclusion Clause, 60
IOWA L. REV. 239, 254-59 (1974). See generally Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 1024 (1972)
(discussing intrafamilial exclusion clause cases).
50. In Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wiscomb, 25 Wash. App. 841, 611 P.2d 1304
(1980), however, a family exclusion clause in an automobile insurance contract
was held invalid as contrary to public policy. The Supreme Court of Idaho, in
Porter v. Farmer's Inc. Co. of Idaho, 102 Idaho 132, 627 P.2d 311 (1981), rejected
Wiscomb, reasoning that:
the right to sue a spouse for injuries caused by that spouse is an entirely
separate matter from the contractual obligation of an insurance com-
pany to pay for those injuries. The fact that there is or is not an insur-
ance policy in force covering an accident does not affect the right of one
spouse to sue and obtain a judgment against the other spouse.
Id at 136, 627 P.2d at 315. Thus, the Porter court held that the validity of a
contractual exclusion of spousal coverage in an insurance policy was unaffected
by the abrogation of interspousal immunity.
51. Boblitz, 296 Md. at 275, 462 A.2d at 522. The court stated that the cause of action
accrues when the plaintiff discovers that a negligent tort has been committed
against him; it excludes actions for torts known to have been committed before
the opinion but previously barred by interspousal immunity. Id at 275 n. 19, 462
A.2d at 522 n.19.
52. Support for the proposition that the prospective holding is meant as a warning to
insurers is found in Greenstone, Abolition of Intra-Family Immunity, 7 THE Fo-
RUM 82, 87-88 (1972), which the Boblitz court referred to in footnote 14. Green-
stone notes that the purpose of prospective holdings is to "enable interested
parties such as insurance carriers or the insured to be forewarned and be guided
accordingly." Id. at 88.
53. See Boblitz, 296 Md. at 282-88, 462 A.2d at 524-27 (Couch & Rodowsky, JJ.,
dissenting).
54. See, e.g., Hauch v. Connor, 295 Md. 120, 453 A.2d 1207 (1983); Deems v. West-
ern Md. Ry., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967); DeMuth v. Old Town Bank, 85
Md. 315, 37 A. 266 (1897).
55. See Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 458-60, 456 A.2d
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wariness, the court has been equally adamant in recognizing that "the
common law is subject to modification in light of changing conditions
or increased knowledge." 56 Although the General Assembly had failed
to act to abolish interspousal immunity, this inaction was by no means
conclusive as to the legislative intent to keep the rule intact. 7 The Bob-
litz majority aptly recognized that it should not defer to the legislature
on the issue, one of judicial origin, merely because the General Assem-
bly had addressed the spousal immunity question but had failed to take
action.
Although Boblitz noted that the interspousal immunity rule is a
"rule in derogation of women,"5 8 it is actually twice as harsh as this
description. By precluding all suits in tort between spouses, the rule
affected married men and women equally. 9 Thus, although the immu-
nity originated from discrimination against women-the laws of cover-
ture-today the rule discriminates against the class of married
persons.6 ° The rule created situations where a married person would
894, 903 (1983) (listing Maryland cases that declined to alter a common law rule
because change involved public policy).
56. Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 438 A.2d 1301 (1981) (modifying common law
rule prohibiting defense counsel to waive defendant's right to be present at all
stages of trial); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464
(1981) (modifying common law "terminable at will" doctrine); Condore v. Prince
George's County, 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (1981) (abrogating doctrine of
necessaries); Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979) (abolishing crime
of misprision of felony).
57. By contrast, the court of appeals recently refused to replace contributary negli-
gence with a comparative negligence doctrine. Harrison v. Montgomery County
Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 456 A.2d 894 (1983). The Harrison court deferred to
the General Assembly, reasoning that comparative negligence "is not a unitary
doctrine, but one which has been adopted in pure or modified form ...
Whether to adopt either pure or modified comparative fault plainly involves ma-
jor policy considerations." Id at 462, 456 A.2d at 904.
While the Boblitz majority distinguished Harrison, the two decisions are diffi-
cult to reconcile. States abrogating interspousal immunity have not employed a
unitary method. See supra note 37. Further, as the dissent noted, the legislature
has considered both contributory negligence and interspousal immunity without
acting on either. Boblitz, 296 Md. at 287, 462 A.2d at 527 (Couch & Rodowsky,
JJ., dissenting). Perhaps the discrepancy can be explained by the court of appeals'
attitude toward the respective issues. While the court deemed contributory negli-
gence to be viable, Harrison, 295 Md. at 463, 456 A.2d at 905, it recognized that
interspousal immunity was dated. Boblitz, 296 Md. at 273, 462 A.2d at 521.
58. Boblitz, 296 Md. at 245, 462 A.2d at 507.
59. This was not so at common law. At common law, the rule operated more harshly
against a wife than a husband. Because the husband was likely to control the
family funds--only he could contract- interspousal suits were usually attempted
only by the wife. Cf W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at *442 (explaining hus-
band and wife relationship during coverture). At present, however, since both
spouses carry liability insurance or have income, either may attempt to bring suit.
60. Thus the Boblitz court's reliance upon article 46 of the Declaration of Rights as
support for its decision, see infra text at note 39, may be misplaced. An equal
protection analysis may perhaps be more appropriate. But see Palewonsky v.
Palewonsky, 446 F.2d 178, 181-82 (1971) (no equal protection violation since doc-
trine bore reasonable relation to purpose), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919 (1972); Al-
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be injured by the negligence of another and left without remedy, a re-
sult that contravenes the very core of the judicial system.
Boblitz has taken a significant step in removing the ancient bar in
negligence cases, but the opinion leaves unanswered whether the im-
munity remains with respect to intentional torts. The court's decision
in Lusby v. Lusby6 does not expressly abrogate the rule as to inten-
tional torts, but only as to "outrageous" intentional torts. Although a
recent decision by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 62 has con-
strued Lusby as sanctioning interspousal claims for all intentional
torts,63 there is authority that Lusby only permits interspousal suits for
extreme intentional conduct.64 The interspousal immunity is equally
outmoded in the context of intentional torts as in negligent torts, and
the court of appeals must now clearly establish that interspousal immu-
nity is completely abolished in Maryland.
Brian Seth Jablon
free v. Alfree, 410 A.2d 161, 163 (Del. 1979) (interspousal immunity does not
violate equal protection).
61. 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978).
62. Bender v. Bender, 57 Md. App. 593, 471 A.2d 335 (1984).
63. Id at 599-602, 471 A.2d at 338-39.
64. Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 461 n.12, 456 A.2d
894, 904 n. 12 (1982) (Lusby modified "the common law rule of interspousal im-
munity in cases involving extremely outrageous tortious conduct"); Note, Torts-
Interspousal Immunit--Maryland Abrogates Interspousal Immunity in Cases of
Outrageous Intentional Torts, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 584, 593 (1979) ("The court of
appeals in Lusby carved out a narrow exception to the doctrine of interspousal
immunity in cases of outrageous intentional torts.").
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